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A NEW CONCEPT OF CONSENT AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
rCOERCED TREATIES" AND THE CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Stuart S. Malawer*

I.

Introduction The New Concept of Consent in
Treaty Law and Traditional International Law.

Generally, the basis of obligation under traditional
international legal theory has been consent of the state in
assuming the obligation. 1 Professor Brierly stated in 1928
in his lectures delivered at the Hague Academy of International
Law,
The doctrine that consent may be a basis of legal
obligation is at least as old as the Digest, where
Hermogenianus is quoted for the proposition that
rules which have been approved by long custom and
observed for very many years, are observed no less
than those which are written . . . and it would be

possible to collect an imposing array of authority
to a similar effect from subsequent legal literature.
The Permanent Court in the Lotus Case stated a judicial
version of Professor Brierly's observation when it noted,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School; M.A., University of
Pennsylvania. Member of the Bars of the State of New York and
the District of Columbia. Special Rapporteur on Peacekeeping
Operations for the American Bar Association, United Nations
Committee.
1. This is a basic tenet of the positivist school of
international law. A major dissenter from this proposition
during the inter-war period was Professor Brierly. See
J. BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-66
(H. Lauterpacht & C. Waldock eds. 1958). For the original
French verson, see Brierly, Le Fondement du Caractere
Obligatoire du Droit International, 23 RECUEIL DES COURS
(NETH.) 463 (1928).
2. Id. at 9. Professor Brierly rejected the positivist
notion that consent forms the basis of international obligations
*

The rules of law building upon States therefore
emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as
expressing principles of law and established in
order to regulate the relations between these coexisting independent communities or with a view to
3
the achievement of common aims.
There have been, however, many instances under traditional
international legal theory when a state's consent has not been
required. Professor Brierly, in a trenchant critique, has
stated that consent as the basic concept of obligation under
customary international law has involved no more than the use
of a legal fiction.4 Moreover, the traditional notion of
consent in treaty law has stated that any form of coercion on
the state does not invalidate a treaty; freely given consent
is not required.5 Furthermore consent by new states to

in international law. "The attempt to build the state out of
a social contract has been abandoned by political philosophy
for at least a century, and the attempt to base international
law on the consenting wills of individual states alone is
merely a survival in the international field of this discredited
doctrine." Id. at 16.
The Case of the S.S. "Lotus 'r,

3.

[1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A,

No. 9, at 18; 2 M. HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 35 (1935); see
Green, The Impact of the New States on International Law,
4 ISRAEL L. REV. 27 (1969).
4. "The truth is that the doctrine that tacit consent
can be the ultimate basis of obligation in customary law has
always involved a fiction, for it requires us to assume from
the mere fact that a rule is observed and treated as obligatory
that those who recognize its obligatory force have consented
to it, and this may or may not be true in fact." J. BRIERLY,
supra note 1, at 12. Mr. Oscar Schacter identified a "baker's
dozen of [theories] which have been put forward as the basis
(or as one of the bases) of obligation in international
law .

.

.

."

Schacter, Towards a Theory of International

Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300, 301 (1968). In addition to
consent of states, which is listed first, he adds in part,
customary practice, natural law, consensus of the international
community, social necessity, systemic goals, shared expectations
and rules of recognition. Id.
5. Professor Whitton stated in 1935, "rThe law of nations
permits, indeed even sanctions certain agreements which lack an

existing rules of customary international law has been implied
regardless of any actual consent. The positivist theorists
have presumed that the states which came into existence in
1919 implicitly consented to the existing international law
when committing their first state acts. 6
More recently, however, the Afro-Asian states that have
come into existence since 1945 have challenged this traditional
notion of consent that obligates states to observe rules of
international law to which they have never actually consented.7
These states, as well as the Latin American and Communist
states, 8 have also objected to those legal rules that do not
require freely given consent as a prerequisite to treaty
obligations. In an effort to establish a requirement of actual
and freely given consent as the basis of international obligations, these Inew statesr 9 have attempted to translate the
principle of sovereign equality into specific rules of international law and to apply these rules to the traditional notions

element considered in all legal systems as indispensible to
the validity of a contract: the will of the parties freely
expressed. As is well known, a treaty obtained under duress
may be legitimate in international law, and this anomaly is
the direct consequence of another peculiarity of the international system: the prevalence of wars, which end almost
inevitably in a treaty imposed by force." Whitton, The Sanctity
of Treaties (Pacta Sunt Servanda), 313 INT'L CONCILIATION 393,
406 (1935).
6. J. BRIERLY, supra note 1, at 12. Professor Brierly
discussing W. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (8th ed. 1924).
7. S. SINHA, NEW NATIONS AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 84 (1967);
J. SYATAUW, SOME NEWLY ESTABLISHED ASIAN STATES AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 230-34 (1961) (Yale J.S.D.
thesis).
8. Freeman, Some Aspects of Soviet Influence on International Law, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 710 (1968); see K. GORZYBOWSKI,
SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 445, 448 (1970).
9. In this essay, the term "new states" refers to the
underdeveloped states and, in addition, to states of the
Communist bloc. It will be used interchangeably with the term
"dissatisfied" or underdeveloped states. For a recent discussion of the conflict between the "new" and "old" states,
see Friedmann, The Confrontation of Equality and Equalitarianism:
Institution-Building Through International Law, in THE RELEVANCE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1968).

of consent. It is these rules, derived from the legal fiction
of absolute sovereign equality, 1 0 that are being translated
into rules of treaty law governing the formulation and interpretation of treaties. 1I The technique of inferring or
implying consent as a basis of obligation in conventional
international law 1 2 is specifically rejected. Instead, the
new states want rights contracted away to be limited to those
rights explicitly contracted away without any coercion.
Consent, they argue, must be expressed and narrowly construed.
Evidence of this new concept of consent is induced from the
work surrounding Article 52 (Coerced Consent Invalidates
Treaties) of the United Nations' recently concluded Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties as it was developed first
by the International Law Commission and then by the Vienna

10. "The principle of state equality in international
law was a creation of the publicists. It was derived from
the application to nations of theories of natural law, the
state of nature, and natural equality .

.

.

.

It had its

beginning as a naturalist doctrine in the writings of that
school of publicists who acknowledged the leadership of
Pufendorf and the inspiration of Thomas Hobbes .

.

.

.

[T]he

principle was reenforced by theories of sovereignty. The
absolute equality of sovereign states became one of the primary
postulates of le droit des gens theorique." E. DICKINSON, THE
EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 334 (1920).
11. The discussion of Article 52 (Coerced Consent Invalidates Treaties) of the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties
can be considered a case study in analyzing the difference
between the "satisfied" and the "dissatisfied" states.
Friedheim, The "Satisfied" and "Dissatisfied" States Negotiate
International Law: A Case Study, 18 WORLD POL. 20 (1965).
12. The dissatisfied states' adherence to a strict
positivist notion of consent is both paradoxical and a perversion of the inductive approach to international law. These
states allege that obligations explicitly induced from contemporary customary practice or treaty practice can bind a state.
Yet, they adhere to the concept of sovereign equality, which is
a fiction deduced from naturalist theories. "[T]he inductive
treatment of international law is . .

.

. to safeguard inter-

national law against the subjectivism of deductive speculation
and eclectic caprice, and the vested interests prone to use -and abuse -- both." G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1965).

Conference of 1968-1969. 13
The theme of this essay is that this new emerging
concept of consent, as evidenced by Article 52, is detrimental to the development of a peaceful international system.
The essay's conclusion is that, given this new notion of
consent, procedures and rules must be developed for the
effective future use of international peacekeeping forces and
for treaties to settle intezrnational crises.

13. The International La Commission began its efforts to
codify the law of treaties in 1949. After several interruptions
and preliminary drafts the Commission presented its final draft
articles to the United Nations General Assembly in 1966. The
General Assembly approved the Commission's work and voted to
hold the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1968-69.
Out of this conference 85 Articles were adopted including
Article 52 discussed in this essay. See generally Comment, A
Background Report on Codification of the Law of Treaties at the
Vienna Conference, 43 TUL. L. REV. 798 (1969).
Another development that evidences a new concept of consent
pertaining to rules of treaty law under customary international
law is the United Nations' practice relating to the interpretation
of the governing agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of the
United Nations' first peacekeeping forces in May 1967, the United
Nations Emergency Force. "[I]t should not be forgotten that
international organizations, like states, make law not only by
what they say, but also by what they do. Their practice
constitutes today one area where customary law is growing at a
pace sufficiently rapid for our times." Fatouros, Participation
of the 'New' States in the International Legal Order of the
Future in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER -TRENDS AND PATTERNS 317, 361 n.92 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969).
Professor Clive Parry argued that the practice of international
organizations represents a new authoritative source of international law, even though this source is not mentioned by
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Professor Parry stated, "That this is the case is admirably
demonstrated in Mrs. Higgins' recent study of the development
of international law through the political organs of the United
Nations."
[R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTETMlITIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963).]
C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 115
(1965). The practice of the United Nations is that of the

The approach of the essay is to apply a policy-oriented
framework of analysis to the discussion of Article 52. This
posits a limited contextual approach emphasizing the maintenance
14
of a minimal world public order by managing regional conflict.
The point ought to be emphasized that the international legal
order is decentralized and reflects a horizontal structure of
authority. Such a diverse system necessitates utilizing a
limited contextual approach for thp purpose of taking into
account as many variables as possible.
The essay first attempts to identify the new emerging
concept of consent by an analysis of Article 52.15 Secondly,
by the use of a model of a regional conflict, it makes an
effort to identify the implications of this new notion of

withdrawal of UNEF by the Secretary-General under delegated
authority from the General Assembly. See generally Elaraby,
United Nations Peacekeeping by Consent: A Case Study of the
Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, 1 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 148 (1968). For a convenient collection of
documents on the withdrawal of UNEF and all documents relating
to the history of UNEF, see R. HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING, 1946-1967 -- DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 221, 338-49
(1969). Rosalyn Higgins states, "The question of the consent
of Egypt . . . was at issue in respect to the establishment of
UNEF . . . and its [the host state's] ability to determine the
appropriate moment of withdrawal . . . . The need to test the

concept of consent arose in dramatic form in May 1967 when
President Nassar asked UNEF to withdraw." Id. at 336, 338.
14. FALK, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and
Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 295 (1959).
"The principal point . . . is to consider the impact of the

extralegal setting of international society upon the tasks of
and prospects for international legal order." R. FALK, LEGAL
ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD at vii (1968) [hereinafter cited as
See also R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN
FALK, LEGAL ORDER].
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 513-33 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
FALK, STATUS].
15. See S. ROSENNE, LAW OF TREATIES, GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION (1970); Rosenne, The
Temporal Application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 4 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1970). Although the United
Nations organs offer considerable assistance, one basic problem
in any study of international conduct of the new states is the

consent for international organizations and states as they
attempt to utilize peace treaties and treaties governing
peacekeeping forces to manage regional conflict. The ArabIsraeli conflict is used as the empirical referent of a model
of a regional conflict. Thirdly, it offers several tentative
suggestions to counteract the detrimental implications of this
new notion of consent and fourthly, the essay concludes by
discussing the role of the wnew states in the recent develop16
ments in international law.

II.

Article 52 (Coerced Consent Invalidates Treaties) of
the Convention on the Law of Treaties.
A.

General Background

Professor Friedmann has described the general attitude
of the new or "dissatisfied'1 7 states toward the "outdated"
rules of law and participation in codification conventions:
[New] states feared that they would be subject to
the customary rules of international law which
they did not recognize and which they had played
no part in forming.

Others [felt]

. . . that the

"scarcity of relevant materials and documents." Fatouros,
supra note 13, at 321.
16. An underlying assumption of the essay's methodology
is that state practice in international organizations is
authoritative evidence of the concept of consent in rules of
treaty law. This essay assumes, also, that the positivist
notion of consent can be correctly identified as the
"traditional" concept of consent accepted by states prior to
World War II. An attempt is first made to analyze recent
developments in the international system, specifically the
practice of the United Nations and states in the United Nations,
in the context of this older notion of consent. Secondly, the
essay makes an essentially two-dimensional analysis discussing
the impact of Article 52 on the management of regional conflicts and examining the role of the new states in the
developing international legal order through the "CommissionConference" codification process.
17. See note 9 and 11 supra.

codification and progressive development of international law would facilitate the elimination of
outdated and unjust treaties by which the colonial
18
powers were guaranteed advantageous positions.
This general attitude of the new states was manifest at the
Vienna Conference of 1968-1969 as it conflicted with the
desire of the Itolder" or industralized states to maintain
existing rules. Delegates at the Conference and Commission
hearings, by their statements and their votes on Article 52,
demonstrated a voting alliance in which the new and underdeveloped states often opposed the older and industrialized
states. The Communist states voted with the former group, as
19
did the Latin American states.

18. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 206 (1964) (emphasis added). See also Stanford, United
Nations Law of Treaties Conference: First Session, 19 U. TORONTO
L.J. 59 (1969); 574 INT'L CONCILIATION 171 (1969) (discussing
Vienna Convention); Comment, A Background Report on Codification
of the Law of Treaties at the Vienna Conference, 43 TUL. L. REV.
798 (1969). Professor Percy Corbett has stated: "In the
clarification, development and codification of public international law, the United Nations performance already exceeds
the entire record of the nineteenth century plus that of the
League of Nations. .
the Law of Treaties.

.

.

.

.

.

[V]aluable will be the agreement on
In the years of scholarly labor

devoted to the monumental draft and commentary submitted to the
prepatory conference of 1968, the International Law Commission
again demonstrated its merits not only as an agency for coordinated international research but as a reconciler of contending theses. To have cleared away ambiguities and filled
gaps that abounded in the customary rules on treaties must
stand as a major contribution to the peaceful intercourse of
states." P. CORBETT, FROM INTERNATIONAL TO WORLD LAW 7-8
(Monograph No. 1, Lehigh University, Dep't of Int'l Relations
1969).
"The creative effort of reconstructing international
law can produce a general atmosphere of respect for it, if it
is revised in such a way that. . . [it cuts]

down to an absolute

minimum the factors likely in practice to destroy the theoretical
equality of states." R. DHOKALIA, THE CODIFICATION OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 334 (1970).
19. Green, supra note 3, at 30-31 (emphasis added). Although
this article appeared in 1969, Mr. Green never discussed the
Vienna Conference.

In treating Article 52 of the Convention, this section
will place particular emphasis on developments since the
Committee presented its Final Draft Articles to the General
Council in 1966 to the Convention's adoption of Article 52.20
Pre-1966 developments will be only briefly treated. 2 1 Article
52 provides: "A treaty is void if its conclusion has been
procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations.' 2 2 The treaty was adopted on 22 May 1969
and opened for signature the following day. 2 3

20. See note 13 supra.
21. For an extensive analysis of Article 52 from 1952 to
1966 see, Stone, Approaches to the Notion of International
Justice, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER -TRENDS AND PATTERNS 372 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Stone, Approaches]; Stone, De Victoribus
Victis: The International Law Commission and Imposed Treaties
of Peace, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 356 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Stone, De Victorious Victis]. The works by Professor Stone
discuss the Article 52 prohibition primarily in terms of a
prohibition against rimposed treaties.r The significance of
this shift of emphasis is that it was the new states' participation in the Vienna Conference of 1968-1969 which redefined
the prohibition in a manner not intended by the previous
Special Rapporteurs or the International Law Commission. This
is evidenced by the series of compromises that led to the
Final Declaration and Dissemination Resolution in May of 1969.
22. Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 679, 698 (1969), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/27 (1969). For
a discussion of Article 46 see, Kearney, Internal Limitations
on External Commitments - Article 46 of the Treaties
Convention, 4 INT'L LAWYER 1 (1969).
"The United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties has completed for submission
to the nations of the world the most far-reaching codification
effort in the field of international law that has thus far
been attempted." Id.
23. As of October 1969, the only states that had signed
the treaty were the initial 32 states that had signed the
Convention in May of 1969, which did not include a major
power, and Arab state, or the State of Israel.
It is significant to note that 79 states originally voted
in favor of adopting the Convention, 1 against with 17
abstentions. Israel voted in favor of the Convention, France

There are two definitional problems and two underlying
non-definitional problems inherent in Article 52. The
definitional problems involve the meaning of the phrases
"A treaty' and 'threat or use of force." The two underlying problems are: how far is the prohibition retroactive,
and what are the essential underlying situations intended
for regulation. This section discusses these problems as
they were considered by the Conference-Commission process
of codification.

B.

"Codification or Progessive Developmentr -- The

Problem of Retroactivity
At the Vienna Conference the delegates from the Latin
American states were in favor of Article 52. The delegate
from Ecuador stated at the 1969 Conference: "[N]o article
in the draft convention was as important to the future of
mankind as Article 49

[52].

.... ,r24 Moreover, these states

favored making the Article retroactive. The Ecuadorian
delegate pointed out that Article 52 is not a new principle
of international law, but a principle that has been a part
of treaty law and confirmed by international custom since
long before 1945.25 The rule against coerced treaties, he
argued, was implicit in the Covenant of the League of Nations,

voted against the Convention, the United Arab Republic (the
only Arab state), the Communist bloc, and a few other states
abstained on the vote. Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 22, at 679.
The vote on Article 52 (then numbered Article 49) is of
particular significance. Article 52 was adopted by 98 votes
to none, with 5 abstentions (Switzerland, United Kingdom0
Turkey, Tunisia and Belgium).
Both Israel and the United
Arab Republic voted for its adoption. United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session Vienna0
9 April - 22 May 1969, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/ll/Add.l at 92-93 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Second Session
Official Records].
24. Statement by Mr. Escudero, Delegate from Ecuador,
Second Session Official Records, supra note 23, at 90.
25. The Latin American states argued that the prohibition
against the use of force and its implicit corollary of no
coerced treaties has been a rule of regional (inter-American)

as demonstrated by Article 10 wherein League members undertook "to respect and preserve as against external aggression
the territorial integrity and existing political independence
of all Members of the League.' He further maintained that
the Briand-Kellogg Pact might be taken as the date from which
the prohibition on the threat or use of force has been applied.
Moreover, he suggested that between 1928 and 1945, this prohibition of the use of force had become a preemptory norm, for
which Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is merely a
26
codification.
It is interesting to note the support given to the Latin
American states by the Communist states. At the First Session
of the Conference in 1968, for example, the delegate from
Bulgaria argued that the principle against coerced treaties
has been formulated since long before the establishment of the
United Nations at which time the nullity of a treaty procured
by the threat or unlawful use of force had already become
27
lex lata in modern international law.
It is also significant to note the objections raised by
some of the states that abstained in the voting on Article 52.28
The Swiss delegate, for instance, stated:

international law, established considerably before 1969 or
1945.

"The . . . [principle of] Article 49 [52]

of the

convention had been observed in inter-American law since
1826 .

.

.

.

[T]he peaceful settlement of international dis-

putes had been laid down in various instruments drawn up
[since] the Congress of Panama of 1826. .

.

Those principles

of international law, embodied in the inter-American instruments
referred to, had the character of regional jus cogens and had
existed before the entry into force of the United Nations
Charter."
Statement by Mr. Escudero, Delegate from Ecuador,
Second Session Official Records, supra note 23, at 91.
26. Second Session Official Records, supra note 23, at 91.
27. Statement by Mr. Strezov, Delegate from Bulgaria,
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session
Vienna, 26 March - 24 May 1968, Official Records, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.39/ll (1969) at 276 [hereinafter cited as First Session
Official Records].
28. See note 23 supra.

[H]is delegation would abstain from voting on Article
49 [52] because, like the United Kingdom delegation0
it doubted whether the principle set forth in the
article was in accordance with the teachings of
history and because its adoption might endanger the
stability of the entire system of international law.2 9
He implicitly argued that the prohibition was not an international jus cogen and that the Convention was neither codifying
nor providing for the progressive development of international
law. The recognition of the prohibition, he contended, would
weaken the basic principle of pacta sunt servanda, and undermine the system of treaty law. Thus, he concluded, Article 52
could certainly not be effective prior to the ratification of
the Convention. The United Kingdom shared Switzerland's and
the other more industrialized states' objection to the Latin
American position. The delegate from Turkey stated that he
also "was unable to support it [Article 52] because [the
Delegation] still had some doubts concerning the precise scope
of the expression 'the treat or use of force.'" 3 0 He implicitly
argued that the vagueness as to the effective date of the
prohibition would undermine the sanctity of treaties.
Prior to the 1968-1969 Conference, governments made formal
comments in 1968 on the 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties proposed by the International Law Commission. The
position taken by the Egyptian delegate on the problem of
retroactivity evidences the Arab states' support of the
arguments raised by the Latin American and Communist states.
The underlying intent and purpose of the Draft Articles, he
argued, was to adapt the traditional rules of international
law pertaining to international agreements to the United
Nations Charter, especially, the Charter's prohibition against
the use of force. The primacy of the Charter was manifest in
the Draft Article's prohibition against coerced treaties. The
Charter gives practical form to those fundamental principles
of general and universal international law and invalidates
those rules that are incompatible with them. The Draft

29. Statement by Mr. Bindschedler, Delegate from
Switzerland, Second Session Official Records, supra note 23,
at 91 (emphasis added).
30. Statement by Mr. Hayta, Delegate from Turkey, Second
Session Official Records, supra note 23, at 92.

Articles, he contended, achieved a synthesis between
codification and progressive development of international
law. 3 1 Regarding the prohibition against coerced treaties,
the Egyptian delegate continued, the principle of retroactivity was incorrecfly dismissed by the Commission's
Commentary to the Draft Articles. The Commentary stated
that the prohibition was not necessarily retroactive to
void treaties that were in effect prior to 1945. The Egyptian
delegate alleged that Article 49 [52] was a codification of a
norm existing prior to 1945; therefore3 2 it could be used to
void treaties existing prior to 1945.
The International Law Commission's Commentary on the
Draft Law of Treaties had commented upon the time element of
the then numbered Article 49.
The Commission considered that there is no question
of the Artjcle having retroactive effects on the
validity of treaties concluded prior to the
establishment of the modern law. "A juridical fact
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it".

. ..

The rule codified in the

present article cannot therefore be properly understood as depriving of validity ab initio a peace
treaty or other treaty procured by coercion prior to
the establishment of the modern law regarding the
threat or use of force.2JJ
As to the date from which the modern law should
be considered as in force . . . the Commission con-

sidered that it would be illogical and unacceptable
to formulate the rule as one applicable only from
the date of the cQnclusion of a convention on the
law of treaties.J4
The Commission stated that, since the Charter codifies

31. Statement by Mr. El-Erian, Delegate from the United
Arab Republic, States' Comments to the Draft Articles, U.N.
Doc. 39/5 (Vol. I) (1968) at 203.
32. Id.
33. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly,
61 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 408 (1967), U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.l
(emphasis added).
34. Id. at 409.

much modern customary international law and Article 52
incorporates Article 2(4) phrase of the Charter, Article 52
would certainly pertain to all treaties concluded after 1945.
But the Commission did not specify the precise date in the
past upon which an existing general rule in another branch
of international law would be deemed to have been established.
In light of the comments by the delegates to the Conference
and the position of the Commentary, treaties concluded conceivably back to the League Covenant could be questioned
since the Commentary considered the prohibition against
coerced treaties as a "codification" of existing law, rather
35
than as a new rule or a "progressive development."
At the 1966 Commission meeting, 36 there was sizeable
support among the states for making the Article 52 prohibition
against coercion retroactive to a date earlier than 1945. A
few states were willing to suggest the precise date. The
Spanish delegate, for example, pinpointed what he considered
the first date on which at least one system of regional international law had taken cognizance of coercion of states in a
treaty law context. He said it was on March 16, 1921. By that
date the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and
Turkey had concluded a treaty 3 7 by which each party undertook
not to recognize the validity of any peace treaty or other
international obligation imposed on the other by force. Thus,

35. The Commission stated that the Convention or the then
Draft Articles were "both codification and progressive development of international law." Id. at 262.
36. In the meetings of 1963 and 1966, the members commented
on a number of important points inherent in the 1969 Convention's
prohibition against coerced treaties. These comments are quite
instructive since the delegates enjoyed a comparable air of
reflection and were not pressed for time as were the delegates
to the 1968-1969 Vienna Conference. This is especially true
since the Commission had requested a series of Special Rapporteurs
to prepare preliminary reports as early as 1952. Thus, the
discussion in the Commission raised problems in greater depth
than did the delegates to the Conference. Needless to say, by
the time the Draft Articles got to the Conference in 1968-1969,
many of the drafting problems had been discussed in the Commission
to great lengths and were considered settled.
37. 118 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, pt. 2 at 900
(1923).

for the first time, the principle that the illegitimate use
of force could not be the source of an international obligation was recognized.3 8
The Spanish delegate recalled that this principle had
met with much resistance in the Sixth Committee (Legal
CommitteeX, to which the International Law Commission annually
reports. 3 9 The states in the Sixth Committee had expressed
the fear that the acceptance of the prohibition against coercion
in treaty relations as a principle of lex lata might create
uncertainties in international relations. They were afraid
anarchy might result since the international community was
still organized according to a system of "co-ordination" and
not of "sub-ordination;" there was not as yet any executive
40
or judicial authority set above the parties.
Although many states now share the Commentary's reluctance
to isolate the precise effective date of the norm represented
by Article 52, the majority of states argue that it is some
date between the World Wars. 4 1 Of those states at the Vienna
Convention, a majority argue that Article 52 is retroactive
until at least the signing of the Charter in 1945. Only a
small minority of states of the "older order" -- the more

industrialized states of Western Europe -- take the position
that Article 52 is not a codification
of an existing rule of
42
retroactive.
not
law and therefore

38. Statement by Mr. Luna, Delegate from Spain, Summary
Records of the International Law Commission, 1966, [1966]
1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.822-843 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as ILC Summary Records 1966].
39. Memorandum by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/371
(1966).

40. ILC Summary Records 1966, supra note 38, at 31.
41. "As to the date from which the modern law should be
considered as in force for the purpose of [Article 52], the
Commission was of the opinion that it would be illogical and
unacceptable to formulate the rule as one applicable only from
the date of the conclusion of a convention on the law of
treaties." Rosenne, The Temporal Application of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 14
(1970).

42. "It is important to ensure that article 4 of the
Vienna Convention is given a meaning consonant with the

C.

"Threat or Use of Force"
Problem of

-

The Definitional

rForce:

The failure of Article 52 to clearly delineate the limits
of the term "threat or use of force" has precipitated conflicting positions concerning the type of "force" sufficient
to invalidate a treaty if threatened or used to procure the
conclusion of that treaty. The conflict has been evidenced
both at the Convention and throughout the Commission-Conference
process. At the First Session of the Conference delegates from
the Arab states voiced their preference for a broad definition
of the Article 2(4) phrase "threat or use of force" used in
Article 52. Mr. El-Dessouki, the delegate from the United Arab
Republic argued that the prohibition against coerced treaties
should expressly mention economic and political pressure. He
contended that the International Law Commission had not provided for sufficient scope to the notion of coercion to include
this type of pressure. In support of his position he pointed
out that economic pressure could be more effective than the
threat or use of military pressure in reducing the country's
power of self-determination, especially if its economy
depended
43
on a single crop or the export of a single product.

intention of the Conference and that it should not, by an
excess of literalism, be deprived of all reasonable sense.
Taken literally, article 4, including that part of it which
safeguards the rules of international law in general, would
not have any force until the Convention itself had entered
into force .

.

.

.

There is nothing that indicates this to

have been the intention of the Conference when it adopted
article 4 and it is believed that too literal an interpretation
of its text, in the context of the Convention as a whole, may
easily lead to results which are manifestly absurb or
unreasonable." Id. at 21-22.
43. Statement by Mr. El-Dessouki, Delegate from United
Arab Republic, First Session Official Records, supra note 27,
at 274. The position of the United Arab Republic on Article 52
takes on even greater significance when one tries to determine
the definition of Charter Article 51, which provides for selfdefense in case of "armed attack." The term "armed attack"
could conceivably be interpreted in the light of the Article
2(4) prohibition. Thus, defining broadly the phrase "threat
or use of force" in the context of treaty law would weigh
heavily in evidencing the correct interpretation of Article 2(4)
in the context of the law of unilateral response to force.

Other Arab states argued along similar lines.
the delegate from Syria stated:

Mr. Nachabe

To attempt to limit that term [force] to the strict
meaning of "armed force" was to exclude from the rule
stated in Article 49 [52] essential elements such as
economic and political pressure, the importance of
which must not be underestimated . . . the Special

Committee on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States had
not succeeded in defining the word "force" in connection
with the principle that States must refrain from its
use.
In addition to the Arab states, the Afro-Asian, Soviet
bloc and the Latin American states favored a broad definition
to be given to the phrase, the "threat or use of force."
They alleged the prohibition against the use of economic and
political pressure had already become a rule of customary
international law.4 5 A draft amendment (the Nineteen-State
Amendment) introduced by these states at the First Session
requested that Article 49 [52] explicitly include in the
Charter Article 2(4) phrase, economic and political pressure.
For failure of support, however, this draft amendment was
never pressed to a vote. 4 6 Instead, a compromise was arrived
at between the sponsors and those states that preferred a more
restrictive interpretation of the "threat or use of force"
phrase. The agreement was that a draft declaration would be
introduced denouncing the use of economic force. The Conference
would eventually issue a declaration accepting the broad
definition of force, but it would not be incorporated into the

44. Statement by Mr. Nachabe, Delegate from Syria, First
Session Official Records, supra note 7, at 274.
45. Statement by Mr. Tabibi, Delegate from Afghanistan,
citing the OAS Charter (Articles 15 & 16), the Declaration of
Non-Aligned Countries (Belgrade, 1961) and a similar declaration
made in Cairo in 1964, Second Session Official Records, supra
note 3, at 93.
46. Draft Report of the Committee of the Whole on Its
Work at the First Session of the Conference, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.39/C.i/L.370/Rev.l/Vol.II (1969) at 250.

text of the Convention. The Netherlands submitted the "Draft
Declaration on the Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Economic
or Political Coercion in Concluding a Treaty,1"4 7 and it was
adopted without a formal vote. 4 8 The Draft Declaration stated:
The United Nations Conference on the Law of
Treaties . . . condemns the threat or use of pressure
in any form, military, political, or economic, by any
State, in order to coerce another State to perform
any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in
violation of the principles of sovereign equality of
States and freedom of consent....49
Thus, the Conference in the First Session refused to
accept into the test of the Vienna Convention the broad
definition of the Article 2(4) phrase. But in a compromise
solution, the Draft Declaration was accepted, which extended
the juridical concept of absolute sovereign equality to the
question of validity of treaties. The Draft Declaration in
its final form was intended to be a resolution of the
Conference and not a provision of the Convention, open to
signature or ratification. Depending, however, on a restrictive
or broad interpretation of the Convention, the broad definition
of "force" may or may not be considered a rule of law.
In the Second Session of May, 1969, the Draft Declaration
was discussed and adopted by a vote of 102 to nothing with
four abstentions. 5 0 It was argued by the same states which
supported the Nineteen-State Amendment that the Draft
Declaration interpreted the
. o . word "force" as employed in the United Nations
charter and in Article 49 r52] of the draft covered
all forms of force starting with threats and including,
in addition to bombardment, military occupation,
invasion or terrorism, more subtle forms such as

47. Id. at 251.
48. Id. at 252.
49. Id. at 254.
50. Id. at 5. See Final Act of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
729, 733 (1969), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/26 (1969).

technical and financial assistance or economic,
51
pressure in the conclusion of treaties.
In support, the Cuban delegate argued that "a restrictive
interpretation of the expression 5 2'use of force' was incompatible
with the spirit of the Charter.m
Other states, primarily industrial, pointed out that the
Declaration in no way may be equated with the passage of an
amendment. Moreover the Japanese delegate stated that although
exercise of political or economic pressure is a violation of
the concept of sovereign equality of states and of freedom of
consent and ought to be condemned, Japan
• . . had nevertheless been unable to support the

proposed amendment in its original form as an amendment to Article 49, for the very reason that the
notion of "political and economic pressure," however
reprehensible it might be, had not yet been sufficiently
established in law to be incorporated into the convention as a ground for invalidating a treaty. His
delegation had therefore welcomed the constructive
initiative of the sponsors of the amendment in withdrawing it and replacing it by a declaration [of
53
condemnation].
Representing two of the abstentions, the delegates from
France and Canada alleged that the term "force" as used in
the Charter and in Article 49 [52] of the Convention did not
include political or economic pressure, but referred only to
military force. The delegate from Holland stated a similar
view:
[T]he word "force" as used in Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter and in article 49 [52] of

51. Statement by Mr. Mutale, Delegate from Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Second Session Official Records, supra
note 23, at 100 (emphasis added).
52. Statement by Mr. Alvarez Tabio, Delegate from Cuba,
Second Session Official Records, supra note 23, at 100.
53. Statement by Mr. Tesuruoka, Delegate from Japan,
Second Session Official Records, supra note 23, at 101.

the convention referred to armed force alone. In
fact, it could be argued that, if the term had been
meant to cover economic or political coercion, there
would have been no need for the draft declaration. 54
As an additional component to the compromise in 1969 a
draft resolution was introduced requesting member states to
give to the declaration the widest possible publicity and
dissemination. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 99
in favor and four abstentions 5 5 and incorporated into a second
resolution, the "Final Act of the United Nations Conference on
the Law of Treaties.," 56 This resolution requiring wide-spread
dissemination stated that the Declaration on the rProhibition
of the Threat or Use of Military, Economic and Political
Coercion in Concluding a Treaty," should be brought to the
attention of all member states as well as organs of the
57
United Nations.
Although the Declaration and the subsequent "Dissemination
Resolution" evidenced the great concern of the delegates to
the Convention with the prohibition against coerced treaties,
the debateg 8 in 1968-1969 evidenced neither consensus nor
unanimity,
but only a poorly understood compromise over the

54. Statement by Mr. Eschauzier, Delegate from the
Netherlands, Second Session Official Records, supra note 23,
at 101. Mr. Kearney, the Delegate from the United States
stated, "Instant declarations and paper resolutions did not
establish customary international law, much less did they
give it a peremptory character." Id. at 102. This reflects
upon the nature of the entire Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which has remained unratified by most of the
signatories.
55. Second Session Official Records,.supra note 23, at
101. See statement by Mr. Yassen, Delegate from Iraq and
Chairman of the Drafting Committee at the Second Session,
Second Session Official Records, supra note 23, at 169, 174.
56. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 50, at 735.
57. Second Session Official Records, supra note 23, at 168.
58. See generally States' Comments to the Draft Articles,
supra note 31; Comments by Governments submitted in 1968 in
advance of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/6 and Add. 1-2

Nineteen-State Amendment that made more uncertain an already
uncertain future. A review of the 1966 Commentary of the
International Law Commission on the Draft Articles on the Law
of Treaties and work of the Commission in 1963 further substantiates the confusion. The Commission's Commentary
contrasted the content of the traditional doctrine of consent
and treaty law with the existing principle of international
law. The Commentary stated the following:
The traditional doctrine prior to the Convenant
of the League of Nations was that the validity of a
treaty was not affected by the fact that it had been
brought about by the threat or use of force. However,
this doctrine was simply a reflection of the general
attitude of international law during that era towards
the legality of the use of force for the settlement
of international disputes. . . . The commission considers . . . that the invalidity of a treaty procured

by the illegal threat or use of force is a principle
59
which is lex lata in the international law today.
In addressing the fear of many jurists that to recognize the
prohibition against coerced treaties as a legal rule may "open
the door to the evasion of treaties by encouraging unfounded
assertions of coercion,"6 0 the Commission stated that their
apprehension is not a valid ground for refusing to bring
treaty law up to date with other branches of law, notably,
the law of war.
The Commentary explicitly stated, however, that the
Commission deliberately left the phrase "threat or use of
force" undefined and decided that the acts covered by this
term should be determined by subsequent United Nations
61
interpretations of the relevant provisions of the Charter.

(1968); Comments by specialized agencies, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/7
and Add.l-2 (1968). For a general discussion of "imposed"
and "unequal" treaties see, Detter, The Problem of Unequal
Treaties, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1069 (1966).
59. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly,
supra note 33, at 408-09.
60. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly,
supra note 33, at 408-09.
61. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly,
supra note 33, at 408.

Thus, the Commission deliberately created a vague loophole
in the Draft Article 49 [52].
This intentional vagueness
was maintained in the Convention when the Nineteen-State
Amendment was not pressed to a vote in the First Session of
the Vienna Conference of 1968 and when the compromise was
given final form in the Declaration and Dissemination
Resolution at the Second Session in 1969.
The meetings of the Commission in 1963 give additional
insight into the intention of the Commentary. It was at
these meetings that the Special Rapporteur, Sir Waldock,
presented the Commentary to the Draft Articles, 6 2 and discussed the ideas of the two previous Special Rapporteurs on
the law of treaties. 6 3 Sir Waldock explained that Sir Lauterpacht
in 1953 had submitted a strongly reasoned argument in favor of
a prohibition against coerced treaties. In doing so,
Sir Lauterpacht stated that the Commission would be "codifying
not developing the law of nations in one of its most essential
64
Sir Lauterpacht pointed out, however, that to
aspects°
0"
allow states too easily to denounce treaties by making
unilateral assertions of coercion might open the door to the
evasion of treaties. Sir Waldock further explained that
Sir G. Fitzmaurice in 1958 considered practical difficulties
in permitting coercion of the state as a ground for the
invalidity of a treaty as too great. Thus, Sir Fitzmaurice
argued against adopting such a prohibition:
The case must evidently be confined to the use of
threat of physical force [emphasis in original],
since there are all too numerous ways in which a
State might allege that it had been induced to enter

62. In the 1963 Draft on the Law of Treaties the
prohibition against coerced treaties was Article 36. This
provision was renumbered Article 49 in the 1966 Draft and
renumbered Article 52 in the 1969 Convention.
63. Waldock, (Second) Report on the Law of Treaties,
[1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 36, U.N. Doc. A/CD.4/156 and
Add.i-3 (1963).
64. Lauterpacht, (First) Report on the Law of Treaties,
[1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 90, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63 (1953).
When may codification not be progressive development of
international law?

into a treaty by pressure of some kind (for example,
economic).
On this latter basis a dangerously wide
door to the invalidation of treaties, and hence a
threat to the stability of the treaty-making process
would be opened. If, however, the case is confined
(as it obviously must be) to the use of threat of
physical force, what follows? Either the demand for
the treaty in question is acceded to, or it is not.
If it is not, then cadit quaestio. If, per contra, it
is then the same compulsions or threat that procured
the conclusion of the treaty will insure its execution;
it will have been carried out, and many steps taken
under it will be irreversible, or reversible, if at

all, only by further acts of violence [emphasis added]
...
. [T]hat if peace is a permanent consideration,
it must follow logically that peace may, in certain
circumstances, have to take precedence for the time
being over abstract justice.Dr
Sir Waldock, himself, argued in 1963 that the prohibition
against coerced treaties would not involve undue risks to the
general security of international treaties, unless "coercion"
is extended to cover other acts than the use or threat of
physical force. He emphasized that the risk was in unilateral
and mal fide assertions of "coercion" as a pretext for
denouncing treaties thought to be disadvantageous. If
"coercion" was to be regarded as extending to political and
economic pressure, the door to evasion of treaty obligations
might be opened very wide because these forms of coercion
are much less capable of definition and much more liable to
subjective interpretations. Sir Waldock suggested that the
operation of political and economic pressure is part of the
normal working of the relations between states, especially
in international economic relations. Moreover, international
law does not yet seem to contain the criteria necessary for
formulating distinctions between the legitimate and illegitimate
uses of such6 forms of pressure as a means of securing consent
6
to treates.

65. Fitzmaurice, (Third) Report on the Law of Treaties,
[1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 20, 38, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 (1958).
66. Waldock, supra note 63.

Thus, the Special Rapporteurs were split over whether
the prohibition should be adopted, but all argued against
giving the Article 2(4) phrase a broad definition. There
was a common concern that the prohibition against coerced
treaties might cause greater violence among nations. Moreover, the emphasis of this prohibition was restricted to
voiding a treaty coerced upon a militarily threatened or
defeated state or a victim of an actual armed attack. Little
attention was devoted to treaties coerced upon parties to a
regional conflict by a third party, be it an international
organization or a super-power.
An analysis of the work of the Commission-Conference
codification process that treated the question of defining
force in the context of coerced treaties highlights the conflict between the developed states and undeveloped states even
better than did the meetings that discussed the problem of
retroactivity. Clearly, the underdeveloped states supported
a broad definition of "force," while the more industrialized
states favored a restrictive definition proffered by the three
Special Rapporteurs.
If restrictive definition of "force," suggested by the
failure of the dissatisfied states to press the Nineteen-State
Amendment to a vote and the statements of Sir Waldock and the
other Special Rapporteurs, is accepted "force" will be limited
to military force. This approach would consider Article 52 as
prohibiting only "imposed treaties" coerced by the fact or
threat of military aggression. On the other hand, if a broad
interpretation based on the Declaration of Condemnation of
economic and political force and the subsequent Dissemination
Resolution is adopted, then defining "force" as economic and
political, as well as military, would be justifiable. This
interpretation would consider Article 52 as prohibiting all
"unequal treaties." The view of the developed states and the
Special Rapporteurs was that the Article 52 prohibition was a
prohibition against "imposed treaties." The view of the "new"
states, based primarily on their practice at the Vienna
Conference, was that the Article 52 prohibition was against
all "unequal treaties."'6 7 Both these interpretations are

67. Professor Stone only identified in a passing sense
the existence of the problems relating to "unequal treaties,"
rather than "imposed treaties," in Article 52. Professor Stone

available to the "new"and I1old!states. "[T]he new voting
distribution in the United Nations [including the U.N.
Conference on the Law of Treaties] makes it possible for the
new States to ensure that their view prevails and they are
able to contend that . . . [d]eclarations carry the force

of law.

68

wrote prior to the 1968-1969 Vienna Conference. Prior to the
Conference, the then Article 49 prohibition was viewed by the
Special Rapporteur to apply to wphysical force." The new
states at the Conference have conceivably widened the scope
of the prohibition to include economic and political coercion.
Thus, the new states widened the Article 52 prohibition, from
one merely against "imposed treaties to all "unequal treaties."
Professor Stone stated, "There is another irony here. This
relates to so-called 'unequal treaties' when juxtaposed with
the treaties imposed by duress just discussed. In relation to
the latter, all three Rapporteurs, with their deeply divergent
philosophies, seemed to agree in one respect. This was that
the risks to general stability of treaty relations imported by
a rule nullifying duress -- induced treaties would be least in the
case of the extreme physical duress of military defeat.
Correspondingly, they seem to agree that risks become greater
as lesser pressures and coercions become involved, such as
merely economic and political." Stone, Approaches, supra note
21, at 396. The term "coerced treaties" is used in this essay
as a "neutral" term, referring to both "imposed treaties" and
"unequal treaties."
68. Green, supr a note 3, at 43. Voting procedures followed
by the United Nations have allowed the new states to use its
organs, conferences and agencies, to pass resolutions and draft
treaties conforming to their point of view. "[I]t is possible
to secure a two-thirds majority of U. N. members who represent
only ten percent of the world's population and pay only five
percent of the organization's costs." Emerson, The New Higher
Law of Anti-Colonialism, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 156 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1968); see Henkin,
International Organizations and the Rule of Law, 23 INT'L
ORGANIZATION 656 (1969). "[International organizations] have
sometimes sacrificed legal principle to the ad hoc judgment
of majorities. .

.

.

I do not forsee dramatic rededication

by nations to law observance, and in some areas some international organizations -- the U.N. -- may again encourage

violations by those who are confident that majorities will
condone or approve them. . . .

[T]he U.N. in particular

D.

Subsequent Third-Party Acceptance of an Existing Treaty
The Definitional Problem of "A Treaty"

-

During the 1963 and 1966 Commission meetings the Israeli
delegate suggested changing Article 49 [52] from "A treaty"
to "Any treaty or act." This problem was raised and considered
in the 1963 and 1966 meetings of the International Law
Commission and not considered during the Vienna Conference.6 9
However during the Commission meetings of 1966, the suggestion
of the Government of Israel regarding third-party adherences
to existing treaties was discussed. The Spanish delegate
objected to the suggestion. He argued there was no need to
introduce the idea of an "1act" expressing the consent of a
state to be bound to an existing treaty. The expression, rA
treaty or act,"r was not clear and since it dealt with a
unilateral legal transaction, it was out of place in a con70
vention which was concerned with bilateral legal transactions.
The Israeli delegate, on the other hand, argued that the
text of the draft article should specifically include a provision that would cover the case of subsequent participation,
which is procured by the threat or use of force in an existing
treaty. However, due to the general desire not to overload
the text by attempting to cover the point more specifically
and confuse the meaning, he consented to see the matter dealt
with in the Commentary. Therefore, it was agreed that

[has] sought to create law (without the concurrence of the
United States) which the United States rejects. .

.

.

Many

nations seem bent on using law to solve 'insoluble' political
problems. .... "

Id. at 679-81.

69. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/183/Add.I (1966) at 3.
70. Statement by Mr. Luna, Delegate from Spain, ILC
Summary Records 1966, supra note 38, at 32. This seems to miss
the point. A unilateral transaction (accession) has legal
significance in the law of treaties. Subsequent consent of a
third-party to an already existing treaty that was intended to
be "open-ended," creates both obligations and responsibilities
on the new state and the states already adhering to the
bilateral or multilateral treaty. 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (1943); The Research in International Law
of the Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on the Law of
Treaties, with Comment, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 653, 812 (Supp.
(1935).

Sir Waldock should withdraw the amendment. 7 1 Waldock noted
that the existing text might be too broad inasmuch as it
seemingly allows states to claim an entire treaty is void
if a subsequent act of participation in it is procured by
the threat or use of force. 7 2 The ambiguity still exists,
at least as understood by the Spanish delegate.
The solution offered by the Commission to the problem
of third-party acceptance to an existing treaty was vague.
Since the Israeli delegate agreed to the withdrawal of his
sponsored draft amendment, it can be argued that third-party
acceptance to an existing treaty is not covered by Article 52.
Other states can argue that the statement by Sir Waldock on
the encompassing nature of Article 52 incorporated the Israeli
drafting point. Thus, rA treaty" can refer to a subsequent
act by a state to an existing treaty; a subsequent acceptance
of an existing treaty may be void if it is brought about by
coercion.
It is clear that the problem of whether or not the coercion
of a third-party to subsequently accept an existing treaty voids
the existing treaty is solved only in a similarly vague fashion.

71. Statement by Mr. Rosenne, Delegate from Israel,
ILC Summary Records 1966, supra note 38, at 35. This request
was the primary request Israel made consistently in regards to
the prohibition against coerced treaties. The 1963 Draft
Article 36 read, "Any treaty the conclusion of which was procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations shall be void."
Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1963]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 187, 197, U.N. Doc. A/5509 (1963)
(emphasis added). The Chairman of the Commission invited the
delegates to consider the Special Rapporteur's proposal,
based upon the Israeli suggestion that would add the phrase
"or any act" after the phrase, "Any treaty." The article
would then read "Any treaty or any act expressing the consent
of a state . .

.

," This was withdrawn by the Special Rapporteur

when Israel agreed with him that this was implicit in the
original wording and there was a general desire to keep the
article succinct. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/183/Add.I (1967) at 14-16.
72. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly,
supra note 71, at 197.

States may argue either way on the questions of whether
Article 52 voids an existing treaty because of subsequent
coercion on a third-party and whether Article 52 applies to
the accession. While the definitional problem of "A treaty"
does not bear directly upon the role of the new states, or
the developing versus the developed states in the international legal order, it does bear upon Article 52 and the
management of regional conflict.

E.

The Underlying Assumption --

Victorious Aggressor or Unequal Persuader
There are at least two plausible underlying assumptions
of Article 52 depending on whether a restrictive or broad
interpretation is adopted. The situation represented by the
German-Czechoslovakian Treaty of 1938 is one situation
intended by the Special Rapporteurs to be made unlawful by
Article 52. Subsequent to the Munich Conference of September
1938, with France and Britain refusing to fulfill their prior
legal obligations to Czechoslovakia, German troops threatened
to enter Czechoslovakia and forced the Czechoslovakian government to sign a treaty ceding the Sudatenland. It is this
historical example that is favored by the developed states as
the model situation that Article 52 intended to declare
illegal. 7 3 The new states, however, would have the prohibition
of Article 52 applied further to encompass the type of
situation represented by the treaties relating to granting
of extraterritoriality in China to the foreign powers in the
late 1890's or by the oil concessions granted by the states

73. The treaty of 1939 between Nazi Germany and
Czechoslovakia is generally regarded as invalid by reason of
the coercion both of the delegates and of the State. RatzLienert & Klein v. Nederlands Beheers-Instituut, 24 I.L.R. 536,
539 (Council for the Restoration of Legal Rights, Neth. 1956);
"The
see Stone, De Victoribus Victis, supra note 21, at 357.
question posed usually arises when there has been a war between
states, and one state bears the guilt of war-making. If that
guilty state was defeated and had unfavorable terms imposed
upon it (as is likely to be the outcome of the Egyptian and
Syrian adventures which led up to the Middle East crisis of
1967) there is little problem (at any rate for present purposes).

of the Arab Middle East to Western States. In both of these
situations economic or political coercion was employed to
gain treaty rights. The new statesf underlying assumption
is that Article 52 is a prohibition against "coerced treaties" '74
rather than the more restricted category of "imposed treaties."
Thus, there are two plausible underlying and partially
contradictory assumptions of Article 52. The underlying
assumption of Article 52 as perceived by the Special Rapporteurs
was the necessity to outlaw imposed peace treaties by victorious
aggressors on victims of actual military actions or threatened
military actions. The underlying assumption as perceived by the
new states was the necessity to outlaw all unequal treaties. It
should also be noted that Article 52 clearly fails to emphasize
the viability of the prohibition on the international system's
ability to manage regional conflict. The Commentary never
mentioned the need to settle regional disputes, but only the
need not to legitimize the imposition of a treaty on a victim
of a threat of coercion or of actual coercion. The conflict
between the new and the developed states as to the scope of
Article 52 represents further evidence of their competing visions
of the international legal order and of the problem of conflict
management.

III.

A.

Article 52 and the Management of
Regional Conflict.
Note on the Contextual Approach

There axe primarily two interpretative approaches to the
articles of the Vienna Convention: the textual approach
restricting interpretation to the written treaty and the con L
textual approach of interpreting the articles in the context

The state got no fruits from its wrong, only burdens and
penalties possibly according to its deserts. But if the quilty
state is the victor (aggressor-victor), it will usually stipulate
for benefits from the defeated state, often involving deep
suffering on that state's people. We are all agreed that it
is morally outrageous for the law to give effect to such a
treaty. But our question is, how is the law to avoid giving
Stone, Approaches, supra note 21, at 393.
effect to it?r
74. See note 67 supra.

of their entirety, including contemporary international norms
extrinsic to the written words. While one of the two articles
on treaty interpretation in the Convention utilized the term
"context," it did not adopt the contextual approach as understood by Professor McDougal, Professor Falk, or as argued by
Ambassador Rosenneo7 5 The Convention explicitly adopted a
"textualr approach that required the language of a convention
provision to be interpreted primarily within the context of
the written treaty. The Convention did not require the
interpretation of the treaty in the context of international
systemic variables tending to foster conflict. The guide in
interpretation was not to be the "intention of the parties,r
nor the necessity of maintaining a "minimum world public order"
by managing regional conflict, but to determine the "tordinary
meaning" of the text of the treaty "in the light of its object
and purpose."
This adopted approach was not without its critics. The
delegate from Israel argued that a contextual approach ought
to be adopted by the International Law Commissionrs Draft
Articles in formulating its provisions.
It must always be born in mind that they were closely
integrated and constituted a single whole . . . each

provision must be considered on its own intrinsic
merits, in its context in the articles as a whole and

75. "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context. .

.

."

Vienna Convention on

the Law of Treaties, art. 31, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679, 691
(1969), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/27 (1969); see Schwarzenburger,
Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation, 9 VA. J. INT'L L.
1 (1968). For critical reviews of the contextual approach of
Myres McDougal see, Gottlieb, The Conceptual World of the Yale
School of International Law, 21 WORLD POL. 108 (1968); Weisstub,
Conceptual Foundations of the Interpretation of Agreements,
22 WORLD POL. 255 (1970); Weston, Book Review, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 647 (1969); Book Review, 23 REV. EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTrL
See also Jacobs, Varieties of Approaches to Treaty
147 (1967).
Interpretation -- Treaty on the Law of Treaties, 18 INTIL &

COMP. L.Q. 318 (1969).

in the light of the requirements of contemporary
international society, and not on the basis of
preconceived and possibly outdated notions of what
the law was or purely idealistic conceptions of what
it ought to be.

.
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This essay will utilize a limited contextual approach in order
to determine what the implications are when Article 52 is
applied to a situation, other than the victorious-aggressor
situation that is clearly within the prohibition of Article 52.
A limited contextual approach is one that establishes a certain
objective as a goal or as an overriding community policy, and
events ought to be interpreted with the posited objective as a
standard. The goal to be established is the settlement of
regional conflict, rather than the advancement of one particular
ideology.7 7 The failure of the Conference to adopt contextual
rules of treaty interpretation will be shown to be analogous to
the failure of the Conference to relate adequately to the prohibition against coerced treaties to the needs of the
international system.

76. Statement by Mr. Rosenne, Delegate from Israel, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.39/27 (1969) at 203 (emphasis added).
77. As a policy-oriented approach it advocates strongly
the fostering of peaceful solutions to regional conflict as
national policy. FALK, LEGAL ORDER, supra note 14. "A limited
contextual approach . . . [is] one to which Falk appears

sympathetic." Rovine, Book Review, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 970,
976 (1969). The emphasis of this essay is on the management
by states and international organizations of inter-state
regional conflict. Professor Linda Miller in a recent essay
has emphasized the regulation of intra-state regional conflict
by regional organizations. Miller, Regional Organizations and
the Regulation of International Conflict, 19 WORLD POL. 582
(1967). "The specter of unilateral military responses to
internal violence raises the most serious issues for world
order.r Id. In context of recent developments in the Middle
East and Central America it appears that Professor Miller may
have over-stated the importance of internal conflict, while
understanding the significance of inter-state conflict. The
Syrian based guerrilla operations against Israel, as well as
Lebanon and Jordan, and the flare-up between El Salvador and
Honduras evidence the continuing danger of inter-state regional
conflict.

B.

General

The solutions to the problems of Article 52 as formulated
by this Commission-Conference process of generating international consensus between the developed and underdeveloped
states have been very vague. These solutions must be analyzed
to determine their effect on the ability of the international
system to promote regional peace. Specifically, they must be
analyzed in order to determine the effect of the new concept
of consent on the role that international agreements outlining
peace settlements and international organizations through
peacekeeping forces can perform in limiting regional conflict.
Even though the Convention on the Law of Treaties was concluded and signed by 32 states in May 1969 and has not yet
come into force, it would be quite correct to induce from the
seventeen year nlegislativelr history of Article 52 that
customary international law governing inter-state agreements
and state agreements with international organizations requires
rules of treaty law to include the Article 52 prohibition.
The work of the Commission and the Conference sponsored by the
United Nations ought to be considered the most authoritative
statement on the problem of coerced treaties. 7 8 In turn, the
prohibition ought to be considered evidence of the development
of a new general notion of consent and theory of obligation in
international law.
In light of the compromise in the Conference involving the
Nineteen-State Amendment, the Declaration of Condemnation of
political and economic coercion, and the Dissemination Resolution,
states seem to be free to define what constitutes coercion.
There is clear contradictory evidence that can be used to support
a restrictive or a broad definition of "threat or use of force."
The new nations have favored a broad interpretation of the
Article 2(4) phrase. While the Declaration and the Resolution

78. Professor Parry argued the drafts of the International
Law Commission evidence international law under Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as being
works of international legal scholars. C. PARRY, supra note 13.
However, the I.C.J. refused to recognize one article of the
Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf as being
part of the customary international law because of the hesitancy
of the Commission in making its proposals. North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases [1969] I.C.J. 3, 38; see Rosenne, supra note 41, at
20.

are not technically international treaty law, the new states
can argue they are authoritative statements of the international community and in a decentralized legal system should
be considered binding as statements creating expectations and
79
norms of behavior.
Professor Stone feels that Article 52 is limited by the
power structure of the international system. Any nation which
has the power to impose such a treaty will also have the power
to perpetuate its terms despite the fact that the treaty may
be declared void. Professor Stone feels that this situation
will not really change until force is no longer used by nations
or until international law becomes so powerful that it can
counteract a strong aggressor. He also believes that Article 52
does not help a victim state. In reality, even if a peace
treaty is void, the victim state would have to initiate action
in order to change the treaty. From a different point of view,
if the aggressor state is beaten, it could use Article 52 as an

79. Percy Corbett has stated, "Conventions, when ratified,
impose legal obligations. It is not generally admitted that
declarations, [unratified conventions], or resolutions have
the same effect. .

.

.

[T]hey express a majority view of what

international law requires and, in the absence of a court with
general and final jurisdiction, there can be no more authoritative statement of what the law is."
P. CORBETT, supra note
18, at 11-12.
Certainly a draft approved by the General Assembly, by an
international conference and then signed as a treaty which is
not yet in force, is more authoritative evidence of international law than a mere draft of the Commission. See generally
Jennings, Recent Developments in the International Law Commission:
Its Relations to the Sources of International Law, 13 INTIL &
COMP. L.Q. 385 (1964). The above is highly relevant. The
Convention on the Law of Treaties does not apply to treaties
concluded by international organizations and states under the
terms of Articles l(a) and 2. This essay assumes, notwithstanding Articles l(a) and 2, the Article 52 prohibition would
apply to treaties concluded by international organizations and
states, e.g., an agreement between the United Nations and a
host state allowing for the stationing of an international
peacekeeping force. This is so, first, since Article 52
represents a specific jus cogens under the general provision
of recognizing the effect of jus cogens under Article 53.
Law of Treaties, 574 INTvL CONCILIATION 171, 173 (1969).
Secondly, the Vienna Convention is authoritative evidence of

excuse to justify renewed aggression instead of truly seeking
a settlement. 8 0 To summarize Professor Stone's argument, he
assumes Article 52 is a prohibition against "imposed treaties"
by military force and concludes that it seems to destroy any
to treaty settlement and to jeopardize world public
finality
order. 8 1

C.

Model of Inter-State Regional Conflict

A model of regional conflict involving a border dispute
has a degree of historical importance. The outbreaks of
regional conflict in Central America, between Honduras and
El Salvador, and in the Middle East, between Syria and

an existing customary international law. C. PARRY, supra note
13. Finally, Article 3 of the Convention states, "The fact
that the present Convention does not apply to international
agreements concluded between states and other subjects of
international law . . . shall not affect . . . the application

to them [international organizations] of any of the rules set
forth in the present Convention to which they would be subject
under international law independently of the Convention.,,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 69. See
also FALK, STATUS, supra note 14, at 126. Professor D'Amato,
relying on the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J.
3, has argued "the actual intent of the framers of the convention or of the subsequent adherents is irrelevant. .

.

If

the treaty manifests an intent to have a particular provision
create customary [international] law, that manifested intent is
controlling." D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the Generation by
Treaty of Customary Rules of International Law, 64 AM. J. INT'L
L. 892, 895 (1970).
80. E.g., the recent threats by the El Fatah directed
against the United Nations Observers at the Suez Canal. Stone,
De Victoribus Victis, supra note 21, at 358. "[Ilt must be
recognized that this whole problem of imposed treaties of peace
represents what we have elsewhere described as a 'limit situation'
for international law. .

.

.

The effect, in these circumstances,

of refusing the limited accommodation will be put to destroy in
whole or in part the international legal order generally."
Stone, Approaches, supra note 21, at 384, 386.
81. The posited model reflects actual solutions that have
been discussed by the super-powers. "They [the Soviet Union
and the United States] indicated agreement . . . for the need

of a permanent settlement rather than armistice; for an international military force to act as a buffer, and for a 'Rhodestype' negotiation between Israel and the Arabs, which would

Lebanon, 8 2 are only recent examples. The Sino-Indian War,
out of which China has continued to occupy extensive
territory claimed by India; the Sino-Soviet border war over
territory previously ceded to Tsarist Russia; 8 3 and the
border war between India and Pakistan all illustrate the
relevance of a model of a regional conflict emphasizing a
border dispute.
If one extracts certain essential factors of the ArabIsraeli conflict and posits them as the variables of a model
of a regional dispute, one can utilize the model to analyze
the effects of Article 52 on the international system and to
reflect upon Professor Stone's analysis. The following is a
model of a regional dispute.
Assume:
States "Ar and 'I' were recently involved in
an outbreak of military activity. State "KIr initiated the
military activity and has gained limited military advantages,
including occupation of territory. State "A" is still
independent and has quickly regained its loss of military
strength, although it still suffers a loss of territory.
State "Alt desires to regain its lost territory, but State "I's
is interested in retaining its military advantage. Although
State "I" is greatly interested in formalizing its new position
in the form of an international agreement, State "A" refuses
to negotiate with State "I" any agreement that would ratify
its losses. Consequently, "A" and "I" have not been able to
reach a peaceful settlement of their dispute.
The United Nations has decided upon a seemingly equitable
solution:
the creation of a peacekeeping force and substantive
proposals incorporated into an international agreement. States
"A" and "I" are reluctant. By political and economic persuasion,
State "A" in a compromise solution accepts the imposition of
the peacekeeping forces on its territory by concluding a bilateral agreement with the United Nations. State "A" also signs

permit the two sides to negotiate either directly or indirectly. . . ."
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1969, § 1, at 12, col. 4.
82. This assumes that the guerrilla movements were under

the control of the Syrian government to such a degree that the
Syrian government was an active participant in the military
activities against Lebanon in the fall of 1969.
83. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1969, at 10, col. 1. See
generally A. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967).

an international agreement with the U.N. incorporating
substantive compromises. Shortly afterwards, due to similar
economic and political pressure as exerted on State "A',
State "II? offers a formal unilateral declaration. State "I"
offers a declaration to the general international agreement
previously signed by State Awr.84
A few years after the above compromise was effectuated,
State "A", feeling ready to upset the previously established
status quo, revokes the consent given to the imposition of
the peacekeeping forces on its territory. She alleges the
United Nations practice surrounding the withdrawal of UNEF
as establishing the right of the host state to request unilaterally the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces and demands
the immediate withdrawal of the forces stationed on her
territory. What is the impact of Article 52 of consent on
the above posited model and hypothetical developments?
If the consent of State 'rAW was no greater than the type
of consent given by Egypt in 1956, the only lawful action
would be to recognize the sovereign nature of State I"Ar's
request and immediately withdraw. On the other hand, if
State "A" gave broader consent than that given by Egypt in
1956, State "A" could seemingly still demand the withdrawal
of the peacekeeping forces by alleging the Article 52 prohibition against threatened imposition of economic and
political force. State "A" relies on the Final Act of the
Conference, especially the Declaration of Condemnation concerning military, economic and political coercion and the
Resolution on Dissemination as the elements of the compromise
over the Nineteen-State Amendment. State "A" also alleges
the statements of the delegates to the Vienna Conference
1968-1969 as evidencing the validity of its interpretation.
Without deciding the legality of its request, State "A" has
apparently stated a prima facie case, since the technical
non-legal effect of the above has often been considered
5
authoritative by both legal writers and statesA

84. "General" is defined here to mean agreements encompassing
substantive compromises involved in the regional conflict.
85. R. HIGGINS, supra note 13. While the Declaration of
Condemnation (concerning political and economic coercion) and
the Dissemination Resolution are not technically treaty law,
states can argue that these documents ought to be considered

The United Nations practice concerning the withdrawal
of UNEF in 1967 and Article 52 of the Convention on the Law
of Treaties seem to provide ample evidence to support the
lawfulness of a host state's unilateral request to withdraw
an international peacekeeping force from its territory.
Despite the fact that the force was there for the purpose of
peacefully settling a regional conflict, it may be withdrawn
by a state party to the conflict. Means of peaceful settlement of regional conflict, treaties incorporating substantive
proposals, and peacekeeping forces pursuant to international
agreements must certainly entail the threat of economic or

in interpreting Article 52. Since the definition of 'forcer is
ambiguous in the context of the Convention, the articles of
interpretation contained in the Convention being applied to the
Convention, would seemingly permit looking at the other documents
of the Conference. These articles require interpreting a treaty
in light of the "ordinary meaning"' of the text of the treaty.
Even though the articles accept a "textualr approach to treaty
interpretation, they permit considering the preparatory work in
cases of ambiguity. Article 32 states, "Recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation
according to Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure. .

.

."

(Emphasis added).

For a criticism of the

textual approach for foreclosing the consideration of related
documents see, McDougal, The International Law Commission's
Draft Articles Upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus, 61
AM. J. INT'L L. 992 (1967). "The great defect, and tragedy, in
the International Law Commission's final recommendations about
the interpretation of treaties is in their insistent emphasis
upon an impossible, confirmity-imposing textuality." Id. at 992.
For a similar conclusion see, Briggs, Book Review, 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 543 (1968). But Professor Briggs disagrees with
Professor McDougal's contextual approach that relies upon "the
intention of the parties" or the rshared expectations of the
parties." "What is regrettable is that they have dressed up in
the guise of modern "communication analysis" a decrepit and
often-challenged view that it is the intention of the parties
(their 'genuine shared expectations' . . .) which is subject to

interpretation, rather than the text of the treaty ..
Id. at 546.

political coercion by international organizations or major
powers. The consensual basis of United Nations peacekeeping
forces, however, was in part negated by Article 52. The only
solution would be to resort to enforcement actions which are
the basis of police actions under Chapter VII rather than
peacekeeping operations.
If the peace treaty described in the model was effective
prior to the coming into effect of the Convention, would a
state be entitled to allege Article 52 as a defense? The
answer is uncertain. What if a peace treaty was concluded
before 1914? 1945? The Commentary states that Article 52
is retroactive, but it does not set any effective date.
Statements of the delegates on the Commentary seem to indicate
the prohibition became a part of the lex lata some time during
the inter-war period (1919-1939). Consequently, the effect of
Article 52 is not only to call into question contemporary or
future peace settlements but also settlements that are
generations old.
The technique of State "A"'s concluding a treaty with the
United Nations and declaring certain concessions as well as
State "III's offering a subsequent acceptance, was obviously

intended to take into consideration the extremely important
domestic factor of public opinion. This method was apparently
intended to save face for both States "A" and "I" in the
domestic arena, as well as the international arena. However,
there is a dual question of the validity of the consent of
State "A" to the agreement and of the validity of the subsequent
acceptance by State "I". Omitting from consideration a possible
objection by State "A", can State "I" allege, due to political
and economic coercion, that its subsequent acceptance is void
under Article 52?
Most likely, Article 52 covers this situation and declares
the subsequent act of a state adhering to an existing treaty
void when coercion is exerted on the third-party state. But
what about the existing treaty? It is conceivable, as pointed
out by Sir Waldock, that this could also be alleged to be void
with some measure of correctness, even though there may have
been no political or economic coercion at the formation of the
original treaty.
It seems apparent that the actions of State "A" and
State "I" in denouncing the previously worked out compromise

settlement are valid, even if economic and political pressure
were the only pressures applied. The new states' view of
Article 52 as a prohibition against runequal treaties"
appears to validate the claims of State "A'r and State "I".

It seems that in a border conflict similar to the above model,
which perhaps may be represented by the recent Lebanon-Syrian
conflict of 1969, the new concpet of consent may perform a
very negative role.
The issue revolves around the effect of Article 52 on
the ability of the international organizations or states for
managing regional conflict by using 'general" treaties -- i.e.,
those treaties containing substantive compromises -- and

peacekeeping operations pursuant to international agreements.
The old notion of consent, in the context of treaty relations,
held that coercion, whether military, economic, or political,
did not invalidate or void an international agreement. The new
concept of consent voids any treaty brought about by any
coercion. The change jeopardizes the validity and viability
of United Nations' action formerly considered valid under
Chapter VI. Thus, U Thant's acceptance of the Egyptian's view
of consent and rule of narrow construction in the withdrawal
of UNEF, and the adoption of Article 52 by the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties, have severly limited the
viability of treaties in settling inter-state regional conflict.
IV.

Suggestions for the Future.

Having noted the dangerous implications of Article 52,
sane suggestions can be made to alter this provision in such
a way that it can be practically applied to maintaining
regional and international peace. First, a more concrete
definition of "force" is needed to provide the national
decision-maker with a guide for determining the lawfulness
of his decision in voiding a treaty. Secondly, the definition
of "force" should be given a restrictive definition, referring
only to military force. Article 52 should be a prohibition
against only "imposed treaties,r not all "unequal treaties."
Thirdly, an "adequate" procedure for the arbitration or thirdparty determination of this question must be provided. This
need not refer to a judicial organ. 86 Even the delegates to

86. "Adequate" does not mean compulsory, in the sense of a
binding judgment. It means a provision requiring recourse to

the San Francisco Conference in 1945 reached the same
conclusion. IL[Some] advocated giving the Court authority
to pronounce treaties invalid. Eventually this thought was
dropped on the ground it could lead to serious dissension
on treaties was a political and
and that the proposed action
r8 7
function.
judicial
a
not
Detailed discussion of procedures required to make
Article 52 a viable formulation in the context of either of
its underlying assumptions -- the necessity of voiding peace
treaties imposed by aggressors on their defeated victims or
the necessity of voiding all unequal treaties -- or under

the assumption of this essay is outside the scope of this
essay. One ought to note, however, that in the absence of a
clear definition of 'force" in Article 52, and in the absence
of compulsory jurisdiction in the international system 0 some
kind of initial third-party recourse should be explicitly
required. This would at least temporarily restrict the state
from unilaterally declaring a treaty void and may influence
the other contracting state to negotiate a new treaty. Thus,
while such a provision may tend to restate the pacific
settlement requirements of the Charter, it would foster a
p
b 8 imposing
peaceful solution by the parties to the conflict
third-party recourse.
of
means
specific
upon them
Another suggestion involves the creation by the United
Nations of a relatively informal process of fostering international agreements between states party to a conflict. The
United Nations could establish the proper rules to allow
states to deposit and register any unilateral statements
approving a United Nations resolution. Thus, states could
come to a formal consensus through an informal process that
would not necessitate the signing of the same document.

a specific means of submission, which must be resorted to at
least initially. Therefore, the procedure should act as a
breaking influence, not one that renders a binding decision.
87. Padelford, The Composition of the International Court
of Justice: Background and Practice, in THE RELEVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1968).
88. For a discussion of the procedures under the Draft Law
of Treaties see, Briggs, Procedures for Establishing the
Invalidity or Termination of Treaties Under the International
Law Commission's 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties,
61 AM. J. INT'L L. 976 (1967).

V.

Conclusion.

Article 52 seems to be logically correct but politically
mistaken. The primary purpose of international law is to
maintain a minimal world public order. Article 52 makes both
the settling of a regional conflict more precarious and the
start of a conflict more easily justifiable. The rule pacta
sunt servanda is sacrificed as is peace for logical consistency.
The international system ought to realize that the limitations on recourse to war cannot be applied as limitations on
treaties. While the purpose of international law is to limit
recourse to war, once such recourse is had the international
system must have procedures available to manage conflict.
Treaties and peacekeeping forces must be available to the international system in such a way that they can be used to limit
conflict in both the short-run and the long-run.
The emphasis of the Special Rapporteurs in drafting
Article 52 rested upon a prohibition that would apply to a
model of aggression which was clear-cut and resulted in a peace
treaty imposed on the victim of aggression. In addition to
this assumption, however, the new states accepted the assumption
that Article 52 was a prohibition against more subtle forms
of coercion. The application of Article 52 to a treaty imposed
upon the parties to a regional conflict was clearly not
adequately anticipated. Yet the implications of Article 52
for the settlement of regional conflicts are great.
Assuming that the new states influence internationallaw
to accept Article 52 out of national interest, this exercise
of influence will represent the success of short-term national
interest over the long-term interest of the new states of the
international system in achieving peaceful settlement of
regional conflicts. This assumption of the supremacy of
national interest has been the theme of a recent study by
Prakash Sinha:
[N]ot all the existing rules of international law
are wholly acceptable to the newly independent states
of Asia and Africa, which today constitute the majority
of sovereign states. They accept some of its rules and
they tend to reject others

..

..

[T]hese attitudes

are conditioned by the demands of the national interests
of these states. Therefore, they accept those rules of

international law which promote their national interests
and they are critical of those rules which are not
89
helpful in promotion of their national interests.
The conclusions of Mr. Sinha relating to the attitudes of the
new states on coercion in treaty law made prior to the 19681969 Vienna Conference are mostly validated by an analysis of
Article 52 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties. Professor
Sinha has noted:
Certain Asian and African states have expressed
their denunciation of the traditional rule which upheld
the validity of a treaty concluded by means of coercion
of a state as belonging to an era when many principles
of international law had been formulated and used for
the benefit of a small group of powerful nations against
others which happened to be weaker and smaller ...
A treaty imposed by force is void because, not merely
the contracting parties, but the entire international
community is involved. The treaty may be renegotiated,
but it cannot have legal validity as it stands. ...
Although they have shoin acceptance of the principle of
pacta sunt servanda, certain new states would like to
see a rule which would enable them to terminate unilaterally a treaty involving interests of a state which
9
are vital to it.
Suggestions have been made to alleviate the paradoxical
situation created by an excessively broad interpretation of
Article 52. One may only hope the use of violence will be
limited by the adoption of either one of these or other
suggestions. Professor Green has summarized the dilemma as
follows:
There can be no quarrel with the African or the
"uncommitted" states if they restrict their new views
of international law to their relations inter se . ..
The potential result of a universalization of [their
new concepts].

par excellence.

89.
90.

. . could result in international anarchy

Moreover patience has its limits, and

S. SINHA, supra note 7, at 11.
S. SINHA, supra note 7, at 85, 138.

the older states may eventually refuse any longer
to acknowledge the established rules under which the
new ones claim their right to exist. . . .
If the
traditionalists and the innovators -- the old and
the new States -- fail to come to terms . . . there
91
can be no prospect of a rule of law.

The only viable developments in international law toward
the creation of an effective international legal order are,
as Professors Deutsch and Hoffmann have stated, ,r[A] faithful
repression of political realities and hence in the interests
of international law itself.w 9 2 Professor Karl Deutsch wrote
further, " [T]he smaller countries may have to prize a
93
flexible peace more highly than strict law."

S.

91. Green, supra note 3, at 58, 60.
92. THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (K. Deutsch &
Hoffmann eds. 1968).
93. Id. at 74.

